From my proposition as a possible answer to that question, the final line reads:
“Because I objectively know that I subjectively know something objective, I am sure it is true that I am.”
Recall Descartes' "evil demon" argument, or "brain in a vat" query or the "dream within a dream" argument - all of which question the reliability of what we sense and thus know, and further try to complicate the question but proposing an imaginary "malicious deceiver" who deliberately alters your perception to make it deceiving - does this "proof" cut through the problem?
It seems to me that the statement would be true in any state - be in actual consciousness, or in a dream, or in any altered state. It seems to me that if the reliability of our senses was in question, it would prevent us from reaching the conclusion accurately. However, once reached, it seems to me it would stand true in any state, thus invalidating the significance of "where our consciousness lives".
Let me know what you think.
Thank you!
I really appreciated your mention of Descartes Demon, i had not heard of it previous.
Yes this demon is exactly the dilemma that keeps me, and I believe us all, humble, knowing were life a dream, we could not be certain.
Though we can be certain that we wonder; and that wonder is a solid steel pillar, whose shape may be indeterminable, its vague geometry and existence are unquestionable.
- Agree with changing "would" to "could"
- your interpretation of what I meant by "any state" is accurate.
To be sure I understand, could you elaborate on the last two sentences?
"It seems to me that if the reliability of our senses was in question, it would prevent us from reaching the conclusion accurately."
Could you elaborate on the superlative "it would prevent us...accurately"
my question, do you mean "it would complicate our reaching the conclusion accurately" or do you literally mean it would be impossible?
and
"However, once reached, it seems to me it would stand true in any state, thus invalidating the significance of "where our consciousness lives".
Can you give an example of a state, in "it would stand true in any state" I assume you mean whether "nominal dreaming(what we colloquially call a dream)" or a Universal Dream(where we are dreaming about being humans at all). Is this accurate?
On the surface, it seems immediately true that this meta-analysis(wondering about ones wonder) is proof of a mechanism(something is wondering, surely!). It is not evidence of the Nature of this 'mechanism that facilitates wonder.'
The question here I suppose is very particular to the Human experience--its limitations and potential for limitless meta-analysis.